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In pre-modern societies the residence of a newly-wedded couple is often
decided by custom. While researchers have analyzed factors leading to par-
ticular post-marital residence patterns, no one has explained why a society
should have a customary rule in the ¯rst place. Our theory stems from
contracting problems created by the nature of pre-marriage human capital
investments. We argue that a ¯xed post-marital residence rule may solve a
hold-up problem by specifying marriage terms and limiting possibilities for
renegotiation; the trade-o® is the rule may prohibit bene¯cial renegotiation
of post-marital location. We compare alternative residence rules (or lack
thereof) under di®erent degrees of location speci¯city of human capital and
environmental uncertainty. We apply our theoretical results to Murdock's
(1967) 862-society data set, augmented with climate data. We ¯nd some
predictive ability in variables related to outside options, control over the
environment, and potential degree of social control.1 Introduction
Customary rules specifying the place of residence of newly formed families are a
standard feature of most societies. Post-marital residence rules play a crucial role
in determining the composition of a particular society, and also impact profoundly
and correlate highly with the way people view their own descent.
Economists have recently turned their attention to systematic examination
of the implications of customary rules related to marriage and property transfer
(cf. Botticini and Siow 2002, Foster 1999, Rao 1993). However, they have not
considered the adoption of the rule itself, but rather have taken the post-marital
location rule as given and considered such variations in size of dowry and amount
of investment in childrens' human capital as related to family income and other
variables.
In contrast, there has been extensive research on post-marital residence in an-
thropology. Julian Steward (1955) and Elman Service (1962) were among the ¯rst
to attempt explanation of post-marital residence patterns, both arguing that \pa-
trilocal" residence, when newlyweds reside with the husband's family, was promi-
nent among hunter-gatherers because it was the naturally superior arrangement.
Men were endowed with a natural dominance in productive tasks such as hunt-
ing, and engaging in warfare; those tasks that required a level of camaraderie and
cooperation that could only be achieved through stable band composition. Many
societies, however, did not follow the patrilocal pattern, a phenomenon that Ser-
vice in particular attributed to contact with the West. Contact with the West
brought new occupational alternatives or increased frequency of warfare, which
altered the traditional need for relationships between males. Thus, he reasoned,
in areas with a high degree of western contact, matrilocality (where newlyweds
live with the wife's family) or bilocality (where newlyweds live with either family)
became more likely to be observed.
The \Man the Hunter" conference (Lee and Devore, 1968) in the 1960s changed
this view. Kelly (1995, p. 270) writes: \A new model developed...that emphasized
bilateral descent and bilocal residence." The new model cast °uid and adaptive
residence rules as advantageous because they allowed adaptation to environmen-
tal conditions. Subsequent studies among hunter-gatherers veri¯ed that while a
majority of their societies were in fact patrilocal, a substantial portion of societies
followed alternative residence patterns (cf. Ember 1978, Martin and Voorhees
1975). In particular, a number of societies featured matrilocal post-marital resi-
dence rules.
There are also a number of alternatives that occur less frequently. For instance,
1the rule may specify residence with relatives on the husband or wife's side, but
not necessarily the parents. In the empirical part of this paper, we draw upon
Murdock's (1967) widely-used ethnographic database (which form a small subset
of the data contained in the Human Relations Area Files ethnographic data col-
lection housed at Yale), in which he and his colleagues read through ethnographic
reports for a large number of societies (the vast majority of which are premodern in
the sense of being nonindustrial) and coded numerous patterns, including marital
residence patterns.
Table 1 describes the types of residence patterns found in these data and shows
the proportion of societies displaying each type of residence pattern for this set of
862 societies. About 74 percent of the societies in the data set are patrilocal in the
broader sense of couples living with members of the husband's family. 13 percent
are matrilocal in the broader sense of couples living with members of the wife's
family. 8 percent are bilocal in the sense that couples routinely live with relatives,
but the side of the family varies. Almost 5 percent are neolocal, in that the spouses
form a new household apart from either set of relatives, and potentially not even
in their geographic vicinity. Finally, in a small number of societies, spouses do not
form a common household.1
Ember and Ember (1971) number among the ¯rst to study systematically the
forces leading to patrilocal or matrilocal residence patterns. Using two-way ta-
bles, they test the impact of the sexual division of labor, the relative status of the
sexes, and presence of warfare on post-marital residence patterns. Using a sub-
set of Murdock's data, they ¯nd little evidence for the commonly-held belief (c.f.
Murdock 1949, Driver and Massey 1957) that the division of labor systematically
impacts post-marital residence location, favoring instead the explanation that so-
cieties experiencing high degrees of internal warfare favor patrilocal residence for
loyalty-related reasons.
Little systematic empirical work appears to have occurred in this area subse-
quent to Ember and Ember's work. Indeed, cross-cultural empiricism of the type
championed by Murdock and his cohorts has fallen out of fashion in anthropology.2
In addition, much research in this area is basically of the two-way nature (see Tex-
tor 1967 for the epitome of this line of research) rather than allowing for more
complicated interconnections and multiple causal factors.
Thus, while previous research has made progress in isolating potential determi-
nants of post-marital residence patterns, it has not addressed the need for or role
of well-de¯ned social rules governing marriage and residence. Speci¯cally, explain-
ing why newlyweds typically reside with the family of the husband is one thing;
explaining why there is a ¯xed social rule requiring newlyweds to reside with the
2husband's family is something quite di®erent. However, it would be important to
try to explain both empirical regularities: that of adoption of a ¯xed rule, and
that of commonly choosing the particular ¯xed rule of patrilocality.
Our approach attempts to explain the forces leading to adoption of rules, rather
than simply explaining tendencies. The need for rules dictating and describing the
terms of marriage arises because families must decide on the amount of human
capital to pass to their children well before the actual date of marriage. The most
crucial aspect of a rigid social rule is that it prohibits negotiation of the terms of
marriage (the marriage contract) at the date of marriage after human capital has
been accumulated. As is well known, the possibility of negotiation at the date on
which a contract is to be executed can critically undermine the usefulness of the
contract.3 When parties to a contract foresee the possibility of renegotiation at the
date of exchange, the potential for an underinvestment e®ect, commonly referred to
as the hold-up problem, arises. The e®ect emerges because parties anticipate their
inability to capture the complete returns to their investments through bargaining
at the transaction date. However, a ¯xed residence rule, along with associated
transfers between the families of the bride and husband, is an arrangement guided
by force of custom. As such, families cannot negotiate the marriage arrangement
without su®ering the consequences of violating custom. Since parties know that
the marriage arrangement will not be renegotiated at the date of marriage, the
arrangement can mitigate the hold-up problem. In short, we adopt a view of
customs dictating post marital residence as renegotiation-proof contracts.
In our model there is a cost to the rigidity of the marriage custom. A marriage
custom must specify beforehand contractual terms that limit the potential of nego-
tiation to gain any unexpected surplus that may be present at the marriage date;
for instance, through disallowing choice of location. But the lack of a rule, while
allowing °exibility, may reduce investment incentives because negotiation at the
date of marriage is necessarily involved. The essential trade-o® involved in imposi-
tion of a marriage custom is thus the costs of ex-post (as of marriage date) rigidity,
weighed against ex-ante (before marriage) human capital investment incentives.
In the next section, we present our theoretical model of post-marital residence
rule choice. In Section 3 we explore some of the implications stemming from
this model using Murdock's cross-cultural data set, which we have supplemented
with additional information. Section 4 discusses the loose ends in our results and
considers how to extend this research program.
32 A Model of Post Marital Residence Rules
The model illustrates the possible bene¯ts of a ¯xed marriage residence rule when
human capital investments are made prior to marriage. The model allows us
to address several questions, such as: What sort of residence rule is best, given
the technological state of knowledge and environmental conditions of a particular
society? What sort of compensation schemes between wives and husbands' families
might coexist with residence rules?4 Why should societies restrict the location and
choices of newly formed families? Why not leave residence decisions to new families
or postpone them until the date of marriage?
We view marriage as the combination of two distinct yet complementary pieces
of human capital. Human capital must be developed prior to marriage and the
process of developing the human capital of potential marriage partners requires
costly e®ort. The burden of human capital formation in large part falls upon the
family and relations of husbands and wives from the time of their birth. Parents
early on must decide which skills their children learn and how intensively they will
learn them through tutoring them, monitoring their performance, and/or purchas-
ing education services. If a newly-created family is viewed as a productive unit, the
value of which depends upon the human capital investment decisions of both sets of
parents prior to marriage, investment decisions made prior to marriage are greatly
complicated from the perspective of the families. The human capital investments
of potential wives' and husbands' families interact in determining the value of the
new family, and the investments of the two families become interdependent.
Couched in these terms, there are two dimensions to the human capital invest-
ment and marriage problem: a hold-up problem due to the nature and timing of
the human capital investment process, and a cooperative investment problem, due
to the fact that the married family has a jointly dependent value.5 Many poten-
tial remedies to the sorts of problems posed by this environment have been posed,
including shifting control or property rights6 and reliance on di®erent types of
legal rules.7 We add the possibility that custom may be another means by which
hold-up problems can be mitigated. That is, when investments are speci¯c to a
particular transaction, investment decisions are sensitive to the nature and degree
of ex post bargaining (bargaining after the investments are made), and to the de-
gree to which parties can ex ante commit to refrain from ex post bargaining. Our
model exploits these sensitivities.
42.1 The model
We model human capital investment decisions as a two-stage, cooperative game
played between two players, whom we refer to as H (the husband and/or husband's
family) and W (the wife and/or wife's family). In the ¯rst stage of the game, H
and W simultaneously choose human capital investment levels, which we refer to as
h and w, respectively. In the second stage of the game, h and w are combined in a
marriage according to a production function and payo®s are realized. We restrict
our analysis to these two families, and do not consider any elaborate marriage
search or matching procedure. The model is analogous to a case in which husbands
and wives are randomly matched.8
Post-marital residence rules constrain the nature of this transaction between
H and W. In our model, marriage customs constrain the marriage process by
specifying beforehand two things:
1. The identity of the acquirer (either H or W), and:
2. A customary compensation schedule between H and W.
Thus, a marriage custom de¯nes a contractual relationship between the two parties
and constrains the behavior of the concerned parties. A matrilocal marriage rule,
for example, speci¯es that the newly created family always resides with W, and
also that W pays some customary compensation to H for this right. W becomes
the residual claimant of the newly-formed family.
If the bargaining relationship were not constrained by some sort of marriage
rule, there would be nothing stopping H and W from negotiating at marriage a
new location to capture additional surplus unforeseen at the contract date. The
result is that H and W would realize that any agreement they entered into at the
marriage date is non-binding, and hence they would not heed it in choosing human
capital investment. A customary arrangement, on the other hand, is a binding
agreement, in that a third party (society at large) enforces breach of customs.
To the extent that it is reasonable to expect that social and cultural norms gen-
erally tend to evolve towards e±ciency, we expect that our results will o®er some
insight into predicting tendencies in marriage customs across di®erent societies.9
To accomplish this, we introduce variables that capture a particular society's tech-
nology and environment across three dimensions. The three primary dimensions
in which technology and environment vary are:
1. Marriage speci¯city of human capital investments.
52. Location speci¯city of human capital investments.
3. Magnitude of environmental uncertainty.
Marriage speci¯city determines the magnitude and importance of the hold-up prob-
lem. An example of marriage speci¯c capital would be knowing your spouses likes
and dislikes and learning how to cater to likes and avoid dislikes (e.g., knowing how
to prepare a spouse's favorite dishes and avoiding cooking foods that they do not
like). More generally, the ability to engage in child-rearing activities, agriculture,
or hunting may only be fully realized in a marriage setting in which each mar-
riage partner is fully able to specialize and employ his or her skills, as in Becker's
(1991) in°uential theory of marriage. In situations in which human capital is rela-
tively marriage-speci¯c, the desirability of a restrictive body of marriage customs
increases.
Location speci¯city primarily determines where the new couple should opti-
mally reside; if the husband's human capital is relatively speci¯c to the location
of his family, it is likely better that he and his wife should reside there (and
vice-versa). Examples of location-speci¯c capital are knowing how best to farm a
particular plot of land, how best to exploit seasonal game migration patterns, and
knowing where the best ¯shing spot is in the area and how best to get ¯sh from it.
In the case of Indian agriculture, empirical work by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985)
suggests that location-speci¯c knowledge is important, particularly in responding
to adverse weather shocks.
Environmental uncertainty can include variable weather conditions at each lo-
cation both from year to year and within the year (variation in environmental
conditions within the society's geographical range would relate to location speci-
¯city instead). Greater degrees of environmental uncertainty increases the possi-
bility that there will be gains to °exibility and negotiation; when a high degree
of demand uncertainty is present, we shall therefore expect the bene¯ts to not
having a ¯xed marriage custom to be large. What we have termed environmental
uncertainty might also capture other unforeseen features of H's and W's demand
for a new familial unit, such as localized demographic changes due to disease or
warfare, for example.
Using h and w to represent the husband's and wife's human capital, the gross
value of the marriage at H and W's location, respectively, is:
V
H = V
H(w;h;~ ²H) and V
W = V
W(w;h;~ ²W);
where ~ ²H;~ ²W are realizations of location speci¯c random variables. The random
variables ~ ²H;~ ²W are realized after human capital investments have been made, but
6before the marriage has occurred. We assume that:
V1 > 0;V2 > 0;V11 < 0;V22 < 0;V12 > 0:
The need to make assumptions on the partial derivative with respect to the
random variable shall be eliminated by ensuing assumptions. We parameterize the
marriage speci¯city of investments by using outside marriage value. In the event
that the parties are not married, accumulated human capital still has some value
to both H and W. We represent this value by the functions
O
H(h;ÁH; ~ ²H) and O
W(w;ÁW; ~ ²W):
These two functions refer to the value of the husband's human capital and
the value of the wife's human capital outside marriage, respectively, and shall
serve as threat points in bargaining. The outside marriage value of human capital
also depends on the realization of the location speci¯c random variables. In both
functions the parameter Á serves as shift parameters and are used in comparative
static analysis. We assume that both functions are increasing in Á. A larger value
of Á indicates that human capital is less speci¯c to marriage. These functions need
not take on purely positive values. It may be the case that an unmarried wife or
husband has a negative value to his or her family (that is, is a burden and not an
asset), even if a substantial human capital investment was made prior to marriage.






Inequality (1) ensures that marriage generates surplus. To characterize the
location-speci¯city of human capital investments, we introduce parameters into
the value functions as follows:
V
H = V (±Ww;h;~ ²H) and V
W = V (w;±Hh;~ ²W):
The parameters ±H and ±W capture the proportion of the husband's human cap-
ital that is transferable to the wife's area, and the wife's human capital that is
transferable to the husband's area, respectively. For example, if local knowledge
of game distribution patterns plays a large role in the husband's production func-
tion, ±H will be small; his human capital is relatively non-transportable. As ±H
and ±W increase, human capital is relatively more transportable and less reliant
on location. We assume that the random variables are multiplicatively separable;
i. e.,
V
H(±Ww;h;~ ²H) = ~ ²HV (±Ww;h) and V
W(w;±Hh;~ ²W) = ~ ²WV (w;±Hh):
7We also apply this assumption to the functions describing the value of human
capital outside of marriage:
O
H(h;ÁH; ~ ²H) = ~ ²HO
H(h;ÁH); O
W(w;ÁW; ~ ²W) = ~ ²WO
W(w;ÁW):
We assume that there are only two states of nature; one favorable to H's
area, and the other to W's area. With probability one-half, ~ ²H = ¹ ²;~ ²W = ²,
and with probability one-half, ~ ²W = ¹ ²;~ ²H = ", where ¹ ² > ², E(") = 1. For
simplicity we make the standard assumption that the marginal costs of making
human capital investments are constant, and we normalize these marginal costs to
unity; therefore, the costs of making a human capital investment of magnitude h,
for example, is simply given by h.
We now set up value functions for each type of post-marital residence rule,
taking into account the incentives for human capital investment under each rule.
A by-product of this exercise is that we also are able to predict the magnitude
and direction of transfers (dowries, bride prices) that one may expect to coexist
with rules. We begin by discussing the value of patrilocal residence rules and
then discuss matrilocal rules. We then contrast these cases with choice (bilocality
mainly, but also by extension neolocality).
2.2 Patrilocal rules
Under a patrilocal rule, newly married couples always reside with H and a custom-
ary transfer between H and W is made on the wedding day, and H becomes the
residual claimant of the marriage's value. Given that this relationship has been
speci¯ed by custom, the expected net returns to the marriage given residence with
H are:
¼
H(w;h) = E[²HV (±Ww;h) ¡ w ¡ h] = V (±Ww;h) ¡ w ¡ h; (2)
where ²H takes on a value of ¹ ² or ², each with probability 1=2. Equation (2)
is maximized at the human capital investment levels wH;hH that simultaneously
solve the ¯rst order conditions:
±WV1(±Ww
H;h
H) ¡ 1 = 0; V2(±Ww
H;h
H) ¡ 1 = 0: (3)
These maximizing values can be achieved by a contract described in Moore and
Repullo (1988) and Che and Hausch (1999). H pays W a bride price given by:
8tHW = V (±Ww;h) ¡ V (±Ww
H;h) + T; (4)
where T in (4) is a constant satisfying the participation constraints of both
parties. The range for which T satis¯es the participation constraints of both
parties is described by the following condition:
O
W( ~ w;ÁW) ¡ ~ w + w




H(~ h;ÁH) + ~ h; (5)
where
~ w = arg maxwfO
W( ~ w;ÁW) ¡ wg; ~ h = arg maxhfO
H(~ h;ÁH) ¡ hg: (6)
The choices described by ~ w and ~ h maximize the expected value of human
capital outside of marriage. To see that each party choosing wH;hH under the
arrangement described by (4) is a Nash equilibrium, note that the wife's family
chooses w to maximize:
tHW ¡ w = V (±Ww;h) ¡ V (±Ww
H;h) + T ¡ w:
Given that h = hH, the ¯rst-order condition to this problem is:
±WV1(±Ww;h
H) ¡ 1 = 0; (7)
From (7), it follows that w = wH, given that h = hH. Similarly, as the acquirer
of the new family in this case, the husband's family chooses h to maximize the
expected value of the family, less the costs of acquiring the bride and the costs of
human capital investment:
E[²HV (±Ww;h) ¡ tHW ¡ h] = V (±Ww
H;h) ¡ T ¡ h: (8)
The ¯rst-order condition to problem (8) is:
V2(±Ww
H;h) ¡ 1 = 0; (9)
so h = hH given w = wH. Equations (7) and (9) together show that w = wH
and h = hH are Nash equilibrium investments given the arrangement described by
9(4). Plugging these optimizing values back into (2) gives a function ¼H(wH;hH)
that denotes returns under the patrilocal rule, where human capital investments
are chosen according to (3).
Critically, the agreement must be thought to be binding by both parties at
the time investments are made. If either party perceives that this agreement
could be renegotiated at the date of marriage, behavior changes, as they no longer
anticipate the payo®s outlined by the contract given by (4). Further, by specifying
the identity of the buyer, the contract has eliminated the possibility of capturing a
surplus in a state of nature in which ~ ²W = ¹ ²;~ ²H = ²; when the environment turns
out to be relatively favorable in the wife's area and relatively unfavorable in the
husband's area. In these situations, it may be preferable for the identity of the
buyer to change to the wife, a possibility that is disallowed by the simple contract.
While more complex marriage arrangements are certainly imaginable, some of
which might allow the identity of the buyer to change according to the realizations
of environmental variables, the simple contract described in conjunction with (4)
has the advantage of simplicity, and only relies on information that is easily veri¯ed
by \society at large." Thus, under the simple contract, society can easily ensure
that both parties obey the terms of the contract, without having information about
the state of nature in both parties location or random components of parties'
valuation of the family.
The optimizing values wH and hHof the function ¼H(wH;hH) are functions of






Under plausible conditions both wH and hH are increasing in the parameter ±W.
Formally, the optimizing values are increasing in the parameter if:
¡(V1 + ±Ww
HV11)V22 + V12w
H±WV21 > 0: (10)





(11) is a su±cient condition for both wH and hH to be increasing in ±W, although
optimizing values may still be increasing in ±W even if (11) does not hold, as (10)
may still be true. The condition essentially says that the elasticity of the slope
of the joint-return function V , cannot be too large. Throughout we shall assume
that condition (10) is satis¯ed.
10Turning now to the size of the transfer tHW, at wH;hH. Inspection of tHW
described in equation (4) reveals that at wH;hH the magnitude of the actual
transfer from the husband's family to the wife's family depends on the size of T,
which is not uniquely determined but may be chosen from a range of values to













In brackets on the right-hand side of (12) is the surplus created by marriage
given that the new couple will live with the husband's family (compare (12) with
(1)). This value splits the expected surplus created by marriage evenly between
the parties, and is the Nash bargaining equilibrium division of the surplus. Sub-
stituting (12) into (4) gives:
tHW = V H(w;h) ¡ V H(wH;h)
+ 1
2fV (±WwH;hH) ¡ OH(hH;ÁH) + OW(wH;ÁW)g; (13)
Since we have shown that the Nash equilibrium solution for w and h are w = wH











A reasonable benchmark is that in equilibrium the size of the transfer depends
on the size of the expected marriage surplus. Note that the transfer falls as the
outside marriage value of the wife falls or the outside marriage value of the husband
increases. It is also possible that a patrilocal marriage rule and a transfer from the
wife's family to the husband's family could coexist. This occurrence is a special
case of our model, which occurs when the wife's human capital has a su±ciently
negative value when not married. From equation (14), if OH ¡V > OW, then the
transfer is negative, implying that the wife's family compensates the husband's
family for taking the bride. Therefore, one of the implications of our model is that
dowry payments are more likely to be observed when the husband's human capital
has a high value outside of marriage relative to its value in marriage, and the wife
is a liability to her family if unmarried, in the sense that her human capital does
not have a high value outside of marriage.
This result mirrors typical features of marriage transfers. For example, Boserup
(1970) writes:
11In regions where women do most of the agricultural work it is the bride-
groom who must pay bridewealth...but where women are less actively
engaged in agriculture, marriage payments come usually from the girl's
family. In South and East Asia the connection between the work of
women and the direction of marriage payments is close and unmistake-
able. In Burma, Malaya, and Laos women seem to do most of the
agricultural work and bride prices are customary. (Boserup, 1970, p.
47)
The methodology underlying expression (14) may be used to describe a theory
of dowry in°ation complementary to that described by Anderson (2003). Ander-
son develops a theory that focuses on the interaction between increasing income
dispersion caused by economic growth and the reliance on a caste system. One
could also apply expression (14) to argue that technological progress coupled with
a strong gender division of labor might also lead to dowry in°ation. If there is
a strong gender division of labor, as the process of economic growth continues,
it is quite possible that OH may grow faster than V H, because as progress oc-
curs the tasks that men perform within and outside of marriage converge, while
OW remains stagnant. This might happen, for example, if men, married or not,
spend more of their time earning wages in a labor market. At the same time,
the presence of a gender division of labor may prohibit women's outside marriage
potential earnings from growing, so OW may remain relatively constant. This com-
bination of circumstances would allow for tHW to grow more negative (assuming
that OH ¡ V > OW), indicating an increase in dowries.
Before continuing on, it is important to address an alternative contract form
which could potentially describe the structure of transfers between the wife's and







H) ¡ ~ ²HO
H(h
H;ÁH) + ~ ²WO
W(w
H;ÁW)g: (15)
The only di®erence between (15) and (14) is that the transfer described by (15)
includes the random components of each return function, while (14) includes only
the expectations. The arrangement described by (15) describes a contract that
allows the families to share locational risk while ensuring that optimal human
capital investments are made, in contrast to the contract described by (14), under
which the husband's family bears all risk. From the perspective of society, however,
the drawback to the risk-sharing arrangement is that it demands that society at
12large know more about the situations of the two families than the contract which
does not depend on random variables. We shall discuss this last question more
fully when we compare the relative merits of di®erent types of residence rules in
section 2.5.
2.3 Matrilocal rules
Matrilocal rules follow essentially the same logic as patrilocal rules, except now
custom ordains that newly married couples always reside with the wife's family,
and the customary transfer is paid from the wife's family to the husband's family.
Expected returns under the matrilocal residence rule are:
¼
W(w;h) = E[²WV (w;±Hh) ¡ w ¡ h] = V (w;±Hh) ¡ w ¡ h: (16)




W) ¡ 1 = 0; ±HV2(w
W;±Hh
W) ¡ 1 = 0:







Under an appropriate condition like that described in (10) and (11), wW and
hW are increasing in ±H.
Again following Moore and Repullo (1988) and Che and Hausch (1999), the
expected transfer from the wife's family to the husband's family that we expect to





where these terms are speci¯ed as of date one, and both parties know this
contract is rendered nonnegotiable at the date of marriage by force of custom. As
in the patrilocality case treated in section 2.2, a logical guide for the magnitude of













The transfer can be negative, implying that the husband's family compensates
the wife's family for taking the husband if the husband is a liability to his family
if unmarried.
2.4 Choice (bilocality)
By giving families discretion over marriage location, society in e®ect has no body
of marriage custom. Families can freely negotiate location (recall this amounts
to negotiating the identity of the residual claimaint/buyer and seller in addition
to compensation) and other marriage terms. The drawback is that families have
no recourse to a third party to enforce any agreement made during stage one of
the game, in contrast to the patrilocal and matrilocal cases. Lack of a body of
marriage customs results in a lack of commitment power. To make our story more
compelling, we assume that:
¹ ²V
H(±Ww;h) > ²V W(w;±Hh);
¹ ²V
W(w;±Hh) > ²V H(±Ww;h): (18)
One interpretation of (18) is that each of the two possible locations is ex ante
potentially more desirable. If (18) did not hold, there would be no reason to allow
choice, as one location would always be better. Hence, higher returns could always
be achieved through a ¯xed rule.







W(w;±Hh)g ¡ h ¡ w: (19)
Returns described in (19) captures the fact that families will always choose the
location with the higher returns, in accordance with assumption (18), and thus
always capture the random component of the surplus. Since any agreement made
at stage one of the game is nonbinding, both parties foresee that the marriage
returns will be divided between the buyer and seller according to some bargaining
outcome at the date of marriage. We assume Nash bargaining, so that transfers
are agreed upon so that the surplus is split evenly between the two families. Given















The ¯rst part of (20) is the expected value of the wife's human capital outside
marriage, which is also the wife's family's reservation payo®. The second part of
(20) in brackets is one-half of the expected marriage surplus. The husband's family














The human capital investments w and h are chosen simultaneously by W and
H, respectively, to maximize (20) and (21), respectively. We denote the Nash-
equilibrium solutions to (20) and (21) for w and h as wC and hC, respectively. wC




































2 ] ¡ 1 = 0; (22)
The important thing about (22) is that, in contrast to the patrilocal case,
in choosing wC;hC, both parties weight the expected outside marriage value of
investments because they a®ect the share of surplus that shall eventually be ob-
tained through bargaining. wC;hC depend on the entire set of parameters, also in







So long as the second-order conditions associated with the ¯rst-order conditions
given in (22) are satis¯ed, it can be shown that the optimizing values wC and hC
are increasing in each parameter.12 wC and hC increase as investments become
15less location speci¯c (as captured by an increase in ±) because there is a chance
that the new family will reside in either area. Since both families take into account
their e®ect on the marriage surplus, they increase investment. Higher uncertainty
(as measured by the spread ² ¡ ²) also increases the levels of investment, since
both families realize that bargaining will allow the new family to be situated in
the most favorable state. Thus, under locational choice, uncertainty increases the
potential size of the surplus. Increases in the non-marriage values of investments
(measured by Á) also increase human capital investments. This is because non-
marriage values determine bargaining leverage and impact the expected share of
the surplus.
As an aside, note that neolocality, where the couple may choose a residence
location away from either family, should therefore increase the surplus's potential
size yet more by allowing even more spread in the potential realizations of the
random variables. For brevity, we do not model fully this choice in this paper;
however note that such gains might potentially be o®set by reduced output if
separated from one's family (after all, it may be di±cult to gauge what investment
would be most useful in other settings). Another explanation for the apparent lack
of popularity of neolocality among premodern societies might be the di±culty that
families face in capturing the gains to the marriage if the married couple is not
present in one or the other familial household. Of course, as it becomes easier to
transmit wealth over distances, and as couples become less reliant on the rest of
the family, one would expect an increasing incidence of neolocality, and neolocality
and choice are certainly prevalent features of marriage in modern societies.
2.5 Comparative statics
We want to compare the relative values of the three alternative arrangements
for varying parameter values. Before doing this, it is necessary to discuss an
additional issue that we have so far remained silent on: the enforcement of post-
marital residence rules. Like any set of rules, enforcing post-marital residence rules
is likely a costly and imperfect endeavor. The costs of enforcing rules may depend
on variables endogenous to our model, such as the magnitude of investments made
by each parties, or our parameters measuring environmental variability, and may
also depend on a variety of factors exogenous to our model, such as the distance
between the parties or even the development and strati¯cation of society. Of
course, permitting residential choice then has the advantage that it does not carry
the costs of enforcing rules (but still may carry some administrative costs; for
example, enforcing any transfers that parties may agree on prior to marriage).
16To keep things as simple as possible, but to also aid the reader in remembering
that there are costs to enforcing rules, we include the costs of enforcing a rule when
present are ¯xed and given by k when patrilocal or matrilocal rules are present,
while they are zero when residence choice is allowed. In the empirical section of
the paper, we describe some of the factors which are likely to make rules more
costly to enforce.



























































where wC and wH are increasing in ±H and ±W, which measure the location
speci¯city of investments; ÁW and ÁH, which re°ect increasing non-marriage value
of human capital, and ¹ ², which measures the degree of variability in the value
function. We begin by analyzing the comparative statics for ÁW and ÁH. From













17That is, changing the value of investments outside the marriage does not change
the value of either the matrilocal or patrilocal rule (though it does change the



























As the non-marriage value of human capital increases, so does the value of
the bilocal rule. This is because H and W weight the non-marriage values of in-
vestments in their objective functions when deciding how much to invest. As the
non-marriage values increase, so do the levels of human capital investment, which
alleviates the under-investment e®ect caused in anticipation of ex post bargaining.
Thus, it can be unambiguously said that larger non-marriage values increase the
value of the bilocal (unrestricted) rule relative to either of the restricted (matrilo-
cal or patrilocal) rules. Incidentally, this result may suggest one of the reasons
why ¯xed residence rules are generally abandoned in more modern societies. Inno-
vations such as labor markets greatly increase the value of human capital outside
of marriage, making rules allowing choice more valuable relative to alternatives.
This observation is an important feature of our empirical work in the next section.
A mean-preserving increase in uncertainty will also unambiguously increase
the expected value of ¼C(wC;hC). If ¹ ² and ² are increased and decreased, respec-
tively, by equal amounts, both ¼H(wH;hH) and ¼W(wW;hW) are una®ected. Note,
however, that:
d¼C






















Equations (25) and (26) together imply that an increase in variability increases
the value of ¼C relative to ¼H and ¼W. Increases in uncertainty increase the value
of allowing freedom of negotiation and ex post choice of location, because location
choice allows the families to always capture the positive random component of the
marriage surplus, while at the same time allowing families to avoid negative shocks
to the marriage surplus that may occur in a particular area. Because expected
returns are tied to the surplus created by marriage, and because a portion of this
18surplus will be captured through negotiation, H and W also increase levels of
human capital investment.































Thus, the value of choice relative to patrilocality increases as H's human capital
investment grows more transportable. Alternatively, as the human capital invest-
ment of H becomes less transportable, the value of the patrilocal rule increases
relative to the alternatives. The logic is the same regarding the wife's human cap-
ital: as human capital becomes more transportable, the value of the matrilocal
rule decreases relative to the alternatives and vice versa. It is also evident that a
change in enforcement costs, measured by the k term in the patrilocal and matrilo-
cal expected social returns, also reduces the relative value of rules as compared to
choice.
It is worthwhile to consider how robust these results are to more complex pa-
rameterizations of the problem. One generalization of the relationship between
variability and location speci¯city, for example, is to allow for speci¯city to de-
pend upon the realization of the random variable. It might be the case that
favorable conditions in the husband's area also render the wife's human capi-
tal more transportable. One way of capturing this possibility is to assume that
±i = ±i(²);±0
i > 0;i = H;W. The fundamental change this causes in the opti-
mization problem is that now both the marginal product of human capital and its
overall value change with the realized state of the environment. By way of illustra-
tion, consider the patrilocal residence rule, and let ±W = ±W(²) and ±W = ±W(²).


















Expression (27) may be increasing as variability increases. Suppose that the
function ±i(²) is linear in ² so that increases in the spread of ² a®ect ±W and ±W
19proportionately. Then, increasing the value of ²¡² generates a change proportional
to the following expression (using, for example, V to denote V (±WwH;hH):
1
2





H(²V 1 ¡ ²V 1) (28)
The ¯rst term on the left-hand side above is strictly positive. This e®ect emerges
because of the di®erences in the marginal products of investments across the two
states. The second term on the left hand side is ambiguous in sign. While ² > ²
by assumption, by the concavity of the objective function, V < V . Only if the
objective function is su±ciently concave is it likely that this expression is large
enough to dominate and make (28) negative.
Note, however, that this extension increases the relative value of choice, as
the ultimate value of choice depends only upon the nature of the environment in
the high-return state. In this case, the concavity e®ect present in (28) is absent.
This logic can also be applied in understanding how the optimizing decisions are
a®ected. In terms of the optimal value of investments, the nature of the optimal
values under choice described following equation (22) still hold; one must simply
replace ±i with ±i,i = W;H. It is, however, no longer true that optimal values
hH;wH and hW;wW are una®ected by increases in variability. The direction and
magnitude of the change in these variables with respect to changes in variability
depend upon how the e®ects described in reference to equation (28) play out.
To return to the discussion of the model, our results suggest the economic forces
that may lead to social preference for ¯xed residence rules versus °exibility. If we
suppose that there is a broad tendency for rules and customs to evolve towards
more e±cient outcomes over time, we can state the following:
1. Fixed marital residence rules: Fixed rules are more likely to occur when
human capital is relatively location speci¯c (either the husband or the wife's),
uncertainty about the ex post best location for the newlyweds is low, and
human capital is relatively speci¯c to marriage.
2. Choice: Choice regarding place of residence is more likely to occur when
human capital investments have a high value outside of marriage, uncertainty
about the ex post location is high, and human capital is not very location
speci¯c.
3. Selection of patrilocality or matrilocality as the ¯xed rule: Patrilocality would
be chosen as the ¯xed rule when the husband's human capital is relatively
20location speci¯c relative to the wife's; matrilocality when the wife's human
capital is relatively location speci¯c relative to the husband's.
4. Magnitude and direction of transfers: Transfers from H to W (i.e., a bride-
price) will occur under patrilocality and should increase with the outside
value of the wife's human capital and decrease the larger the outside value of
the husband's human capital. If OW is su±ciently negative, a transfer from
W to H (i.e., a dowry) may be observed. The opposite transfer patterns
will occur under matrilocality.13 In either case, it is necessary that transfers
be customary in the society in order for a ¯xed post-marital location rule
to occur, because otherwise there will be no way of compensating for the
human capital transfer from one family to the other.
In the empirical work reported in the following section, we investigate the relation-
ships between variables designed to measure uncertainty and location speci¯city
and the nature of post-marital residence rules in particular societies.14 We do not
have data available that would allow us to consider size of transfer. This would be
better-addressed using data from a number of di®erent villages (or similar small
geographic units) within a larger societal structure. While our data are rather
rough, we do ¯nd some of the predictions of the model to be consistent with the
nature of post-marital residence rules across societies.
3 Data and Empirical Findings
Murdock's (1967) Ethnographic Atlas contains rough information on the material
culture, technology, and customs of 862 di®erent societies from all corners of the
world. Of the 862 societies included in the Atlas, 239 societies in the Atlas are
situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, 95 in the Circum-Mediterranean region (encom-
passing parts of Eastern Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and Northern Africa), 93
in Eurasia, 128 in the Insular Paci¯c region (Oceania and Southeast Asia), 218 in
North America, and 89 in South and Central America.15 Some of the societies in
the data set have been extinct for some time (e. g., the ancient Babylonians), and
many di®er greatly in their relative states of development. Modern Dutch soci-
ety, surveyed in 1950 in Anlo parish in Drente province, is in the data set, as are
many Native American societies, such as the Navajo and the Pawnee. The data
includes a rich variety of societies, including hunter-gatherer societies, peasant and
tribal societies, and modern societies. The sources are mostly from the ¯rst half
of the twentieth century, with some ethnographies dating from the latter part of
21the nineteenth century. We utilized a number of summary measures from these
data, some of which we constructed ourselves and some of which were constructed
by Murdock and his colleagues.
The data largely consists of sets of dummy variables which indicate only the
most basic information about each society, for example, whether or not metal
working is present in a society or whether or not irrigation is used in agriculture,
we are able to use the data to construct some variables which capture the things
which our theoretical model deems to be important in explaining the incidence
of residence rules. We now describe in turn how we constructed measures of
environmental variability, technological sophistication, and the location speci¯city
of marriage investments.
3.1 Environmental variability
In developing a set of variables that follow from our theoretical model and may help
in predicting the occurrence of particular residence rules, our ¯rst challenge was
to consider how one might proxy the degree of environmental variability that each
society is subject to.16 It is obviously very di±cult to ¯nd data that will capture
this idea with any degree of precision. However, we thought that climate data
could provide a way in which to consider how societies might vary systematically
in the harshness or ease of their environment, particularly in light of the fact that a
large portion of the societies in our data set are best described as less-advanced and
indigenous. Traditional economies tend to be more reliant on natural resources,
and more at the mercy of environmental change.
We use both mean and variance data to consider environmental variation, using
readily available information on temperatures (normalizing our collection year to
1900). Accordingly, we collect two types of information on temperature for each
society: information on the average temperature, and information on yearly range
of temperature; as measured by the highest and lowest monthly temperatures
observed in a particular region. From www.worldclimate.com we collected most
of the average temperature data and half of the temperature range data. From
ingrid.ldgo.columbia.edu we collected a few average temperature data points and
the other half of the temperature range data. Peter's Atlas of the World (1989)
was used in each case to locate the nearest weather station to the longitude and
latitude reported for the society's location in Murdock (1967). In relation to our
theory, increased temperature, and a lower temperature spread (signifying a more
temperate climate with less uncertainty across time and space) should be positively
correlated with adoption of a ¯xed post marital residence rule to the extent that
22these temperature variables are proxying variability of the environment within the
range inhabited by each group.17
3.2 Agricultural technology
To the degree that societies rely on agriculture and herding, we assume that they
are less reliant on location-speci¯c knowledge regarding optimal foraging, and that
the usable knowledge can be more easily passed along to new residents. We index
a society's proportional reliance on agriculture and herding for sustenance (as
opposed to reliance on hunting, gathering, and ¯shing) using Murdock's measures
of these two factors and normalizing their sum to between zero and one hundred
percent.
We also assume that more sophisticated agricultural methods reduce further
the need for location-speci¯c knowledge, here regarding optimal farming methods
for the particular plot of land cultivated. Hence we also form a variable designed
to capture the nature of each society's agricultural technology. The Ethnographic
Atlas contains information on the type and intensity of agriculture for each society.
Speci¯cally, Murdock reports whether a society practices 1) no agriculture, 2) very
limited and casual agriculture, 3) garden-variety horticulture, 4) extensive and
shifting agriculture (slash and burn agriculture), 5) intensive agriculture using
irrigation, or 6) intensive agriculture using crop rotation and fertilization. Using
this information, we form an index of agricultural technology (agriculture level),
giving societies with little or no agriculture the lowest value on the scale (0), and
societies with intensive agriculture the highest level on the scale (2).18 Those
societies employing no agriculture or limited and casual agriculture received a zero
on our scale, those societies engaging in horticulture or extensive agriculture a one
on our scale, and those societies practicing intensive agriculture a two on our scale.
Our reasoning is that societies with more intensive levels of agriculture are less at
the mercy of environment and the characteristics of the land. As agriculture grows
more intensive, the productivity of land is less a function of the environment as
land can be improved, irrigated, and fertilized. Thus, more intensive agricultural
methods may decrease the location speci¯city of human capital.
In one of our speci¯cations, we employ some complementary measures of tech-
nological sophistication: dummy variables capturing 1) whether or not the plow
is used in agriculture, and 2) whether or not metalworking is used in agriculture.
We reason that these measures are most easily motivated as exogenous (i.e., deter-
mined by technological innovation) to any processes that might jointly determine
marital residence rules and agricultural practice. Further, the presence of these
23two technologies may go a long way in rendering farm land more equal in quality,
and making farmers less vulnerable to idiosyncratic environmental characteristics
of the land.
3.3 Location speci¯city
In addition to variability, the other critical components of our model are location
speci¯city and the value of human capital investments outside of marriage. These
two components of the model are extremely di±cult to operationalize for testing
from available data. However, we reason that the presence of a functioning market
for labor, in particular a skilled labor market, would imply low location speci¯city
of human capital and also imply a high value of human capital outside of marriage.
A market requires some degree of uniformity across the goods sold in the market,
and thus the presence of a skilled labor market may indicate that human capital
value is not relatively speci¯c to location and that acquired skills are less idiosyn-
cratic across individuals. If skilled labor can be bought or sold in a market, the
value of human capital outside of marriage is likely to be higher. Therefore, the
increased presence of skilled labor markets is likely to move societies towards bilo-
cal or neolocal rules, as opposed to patrilocal or matrilocal rules. Unfortunately,
Murdock does not include information on the presence of markets, but using in-
formation from a smaller sample of societies, we develop a predictive model of the
likelihood a particular society has functioning skilled and unskilled labor markets.
We then use this model to estimate the probabilities for every society in our larger
data set of having functioning skilled labor markets. We develop a similar model to
predict the probability of occurrence of unskilled labor markets for contrast with
our results on skilled labor markets. Intuitively, since unskilled labor by de¯nition
does not require a high degree of skill development and hence is not in°uenced by
human capital acquisition, the presence of an unskilled labor market should have
little predictive power in determining the form of the marriage rule.
Our labor market information comes from Pryor's (1977) book The Origins of
the Economy. Pryor's data set contains 60 societies, and almost all of the societies
in Pryor's data are also in Murdock's database (we were able to match 57 of the
60 societies). Pryor notes for each society in his sample whether or not there is an
\important" unskilled labor market, and whether or not there is an \important"
skilled labor market. Pryor judges labor markets to be important if they account
for more than ¯ve percent of the transactions governing the allocation of skilled
labor in a society. We do not present in this paper a theoretical model of the
origins and growth of labor markets; such a task would certainly be interesting
24and would make an excellent topic for future research, but is well beyond the
scope of this paper. Rather, through a process of experimentation, we sought to
¯nd a few instrumental variables in Murdock's data set that appear to predict the
presence of skilled and unskilled labor markets, that are also not highly correlated
with marriage customs.
Our simple models of skilled and unskilled labor market emergence are shown
in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the most useful instruments in predicting the
presence of skilled labor markets. The ¯rst instrumental variable equals one if dual
strati¯cation is present in the society, zero otherwise. Dual strati¯cation occurs
when a society is segmented into elite and worker classes as coded by Murdock
in the Ethnographic Atlas. We also found that the degree of craft specialization
(measured by a craft specialization index) correlated with the presence of a skilled
labor market. We constructed this index of craft specialization by noting ¯rst
whether or not a basket of tasks, including metal working, leather working, pot-
ting, boat building, and house construction were present in each society, and then
noting whether or not each task was performed by craft or industrial specialists,
information available in Murdock's data. For each of the tasks performed by craft
specialists, we gave a society one point. If industrial specialists perform the task,
we awarded the society two points, reasoning that the presence of industrial spe-
cialists indicated a larger degree of specialization present in the society. Thus, our
total craft index runs from zero (no crafts performed by specialists) to ten (all
crafts performed by industrial specialists). As one would expect, this variable has
a strongly positive impact on the likelihood of observing a skilled labor market.
We also found that a dummy variable which equals one if the society practices in-
tensive agriculture, employing crop rotation and fertilization on ¯xed plots (see the
discussion in section 3.2 on agricultural technology for coding of these variables),
zero otherwise, and another dummy which equals one if the society practices exten-
sive, shifting agriculture (slash-and-burn agriculture), zero otherwise to be useful
instruments in predicting the presence of a skilled labor market. Apparently, so-
cieties employing intensive methods of agriculture are much more likely to have a
skilled labor market, and societies employing extensive agriculture are much less
likely to have one.
As mentioned previously, for the sake of contrast, we also developed a set of
instruments predicting the presence of unskilled labor markets. Table 2b reports
these results. Our intensive agriculture dummy proved to be a good instrument
for the presence of an unskilled labor market and our dual strati¯cation dummy
was signi¯cantly negatively correlated with unskilled labor market presence, in
contrast with our skilled labor market model. Additionally, we found the use of
25animals in plow cultivation (captured by a dummy equal to one if animals are
employed in plowing, zero otherwise) to be negatively correlated with the presence
of an unskilled labor market, perhaps because animals replace unskilled laborers.
Further, we found that nomadic societies (captured by a dummy equal to one if
the society was reported by Murdock to be nomadic, zero otherwise) were less
likely to have an unskilled labor market. Societies that rely more upon agriculture
for subsistence (percentage of subsistence from agriculture) were less likely to have
an unskilled labor market, and societies that relied more upon animal husbandry
were more likely to have a unskilled labor market.19 The two equations in Tables
2 and 3 show the instrumental variables equations used to predict the probability
of presence of unskilled and skilled labor markets for the larger data set. These
predicted probabilities were then included as variables in our following regression
model.
3.4 Potential for rule enforcement
An issue we deliberately skirted in the theoretical section so as to keep the model
simple, but one that is nonetheless important, is the ability of society to enforce
customs and rules. Our implicit modelling assumption was that society can in°ict
su±cient punishment on transgressors of social rules, and in essence perfectly
enforce any rule it so chooses. Societies, however, are not uniformly endowed in
their capacity to enforce and maintain rules, and the costs of enforcing rules is
likely to have an impact on the adoption of particular sets of rules. That having
been said, a society's capacity to enforce its rules is not easy to capture, especially
considering the limited nature of Murdock's data and the low levels of development
of the majority of the societies in our data set. These data do, however, o®er
rather detailed information on community and kin group structure. We consider
various measures that indicate large, geographically far-reaching versions of these
structures, or the converse, as proxies for enforceability. Our reasoning is that
societies with well-de¯ned and farther-reaching familial structures will be more
able to enforce social rules. Moreover, societies with well-de¯ned and extensive
kin groups should also be more able to enforce rules.
Hence, we include dummy variables for both small and large community sizes
(as opposed to the omitted category of medium community size), hypothesizing
that small community size will be negatively related to rule ¯xity, and large com-
munity size positively related to rule ¯xity. We also include a dummy if there
are reported to be large matrilineal kin groups in a society, and a similar dummy
for patrilineal kin groups, and assume that these will both be positively related
26to rule ¯xity. For all of these variables, we recognize the possible endogeneity of
these variables in regards to their joint determination with residence rules. Be-
cause developing instruments for each of these variables is clearly impossible, we
instead present results both with and without these variables to see their e®ects.
Similarly, we also consider the existence of monetary transfers (whether bride
price, dowry, or \gift exchange") as a dummy variable in one of our speci¯cations
below. This existence of transfers is clearly developed as endogenous within our
theoretical model as presented above. However, here we consider the question
of whether a ¯xed rule can exist without the possibility of transfers. The model
clearly implies that ¯xed rules would not be feasible without the possibility in the
society (and indeed at least the occasional occurrence) of transferring resources
from one family to the other. Hence our theory makes the strong prediction that
transfers should be positively related to the existence of a ¯xed residence rule.
3.5 Econometric speci¯cation and results
Using various subsets of the potential determinants developed in the preceding sec-
tions, we attempt to predict which societies will have a ¯xed post-marital residence
rule (patrilocal or matrilocal) as opposed to a °exible (bilocal or neolocal) \rule"
(societies with no common marital household are dropped from the sample).
Table 4 summarizes the variables described above and used in our subsequent
analysis. Means and standard deviations are presented for the sample as a whole
and separately for societies by whether they have ¯xed or °exible rules. Statisti-
cally signi¯cant di®erences occur in variable magnitudes across the two categories
of societies in several cases. Societies with ¯xed residence rules have higher average
temperature and lower temperature variation than societies with °exible residence,
which is consistent with our theory. However, counter to our theory, from sim-
ple mean comparisons they also appear to rely more heavily on agriculture and
herding and operate at a higher level of agricultural technology. They are also
more likely to engage in metalworking. Also counter to our theory, probability of
functioning labor markets, either skilled or unskilled, does not di®er signi¯cantly
between the categories. Transfers are much more likely to occur in societies with
¯xed residence rules, but also occur in slightly more than ¯fty percent of societies
with °exible residence. This latter pattern is not necessarily problematic for our
theory, as transfers may occur under °exible rules as well; indeed, one might argue
that transfers would always need to occur if societies were behaving in accordance
with our theory more broadly considered. Finally, a number of societal struc-
ture variables di®er between the societal groupings, and generally in the way we
27predicted: small community units are more prevalent in °exible societies, while
large community units and large patrilineal kin groups are more prevalent in ¯xed
societies.
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, either a probit or logit
speci¯cation is warranted; we ran both speci¯cations, but report only the results
from the logistic regressions, as the qualitative results are identical (i.e., sign and
statistical signi¯cance). The regressions were run using the Probit and Logistic
procedures in SAS V. 8.1.
In order to consider the cumulating and o®setting e®ects of sets of the variables
in Table 4, we ran ten speci¯cations, each di®erent in terms of the number and
type of variables included. This allows us to see which results are particularly
robust to speci¯cation, and which variables are interrelated. Table 5 presents our
regression results. The speci¯cations in general increase in inclusiveness from left
to right across the columns, with generally increasing ability to \predict" the ¯xed
v. °exible rule outcome as measured by the overall goodness of ¯t.
All speci¯cations contain average yearly temperature and temperature range.
Average temperature is positively related to presence of a ¯xed rule in all speci¯-
cations in roughly the same amount. Temperature range, however, is only weakly
statistically signi¯cant in one speci¯cation, thereby failing to support one of our
strongest model predictions. Still, it is possible that higher temperature range also
captures some unobserved component of environmental variability.
All speci¯cations also contain our two estimated probabilities of functioning
skilled and unskilled labor markets. The probability of a skilled labor market
is signi¯cantly negatively related to presence of a ¯xed rule across all but one
speci¯cation (we discuss this result in more detail below). Unskilled labor markets
appear to have no relation to presence of a ¯xed rule. These results are jointly an
interesting ¯nding in accord with our theory. Recall that, according to our theory,
the negative dependence between skilled labor markets and ¯xed rules stems from
the fact that the presence of a skilled labor market increases the outside-marriage
value of human capital, lessening the marriage speci¯city of assets and generating
greater human capital investment incentives under choice. The insigni¯cance of
the unskilled labor market in any of the regressions buttresses this result. This
is as predicted, since investment in human capital is not important in unskilled
tasks.
A variable indicating presence of transfers (dowry, brideprice, etc.) is included
in four of the speci¯cations to gauge their impact on the other coe±cients and to
observe its relation to residence rules. Notably, transfers are signi¯cantly positively
related to having a ¯xed rule, which again we take as a necessary condition for a
28¯xed rule to occur. This also implies that marital surplus varies signi¯cantly across
locations so as to require transfers to o®set the di®erential value created under a
¯xed rule regime. In general, inclusion of the transfer variable does not have a
large and consistent impact on the other coe±cients (as seen in the matching four
speci¯cations that di®er only by exclusion of this variable).
The agricultural technology measures are combined in various formats, rang-
ing from speci¯cations that try to include only the barest technological measures
(plow presence and metalworking presence) up through speci¯cations that also (or
instead) include summary measures of agricultural technological level and impor-
tance for the society. Reliance on agriculture has little relationship to ¯xed rules
in most speci¯cations, but enters with positive sign (contrary to our prediction)
when it is signi¯cant. The agricultural technology level is occasionally signi¯cant
and enters with negative sign in keeping with our prediction. Use of plow tech-
nology is signi¯cantly negatively related to ¯xed rule adoption, also as our theory
predicts.20 Metalworking, however, enters with signi¯cant positive sign, opposite
to our prediction.
The latter speci¯cations (g. through j.) include a set of both community
and family organizational structure variables (again, thought of in our model as
capturing enforceability e®ects, although they may have other e®ects as well, and
may be determined endogenously). These variables are all signi¯cant save for the
presence of large matrilineal kin groups. Small community units have the expected
negative relationship to ¯xed rule presence, while large community units have
the expected positive relationship. The existence of large patrilineal kin groups
has the expected positive relationship with ¯xed rule presence. These results are
supportive of our argument that enforceability increases the likelihood of ¯xed
rule observance in a society. Not surprisingly, including all of the family structure
variables and the technological variables reduce the signi¯cance of the skilled labor
market variable. This is likely due to the fact that technological sophistication
partially determines the skilled labor market variable, and our theory predicts that
the skilled labor market variable should only matter for marriage residence to the
extent that it captures speci¯c features of technology such as location speci¯city.
We tested the robustness of these results by utilizing di®erent sampling frame-
works. The anthropologists who have attempted cross-cultural analysis, notably
Murdock himself, have been concerned with oversampling related cultures. Thus
Murdock developed two di®erent classi¯cation schemes, one as reported in his
1967 book Ethnographic Atlas that forms 412 \cultural clusters," and one as re-
ported in his 1971 book Atlas of World Cultures that groups the clusters into 150
\cultural provinces," twenty-¯ve in each of six world regions. In addition, the
29Standard Cross-Cultural Sample developed by Murdock and White (1969) and
contains \the best-described society in each of 186 cultural provinces of the world
chosen at a time when cultural independence is maximal" (White 1985). However,
while cross-societal correlation is a concern, these groupings have ad hoc features
as well, although they are related both to geographic location and linguistic rela-
tions. While the anthropologists who mainly use these data are justi¯ably wary of
drawing general conclusions based on skewed samples, they are not generally con-
centrating on speci¯c testable hypotheses using multiple regression techniques. We
are loath to throw out usable information on societies by selecting randomly from
these clusters or using the SCCS sample when we can instead use control variables
to help adjust for these correlations while still gaining additional information from
potential variations between closely-related cultures. Indeed, neither linguistic nor
geographic proximity is perfectly correlated with adoption of postmarital location
rules. Multicollinearity, is likely exacerbated by reducing the sample size even as
the various subsample construction methods aim to maintain variability. However,
we do consider whether our results as reported in Table 5 using the largest avail-
able sample are consistent with results derived from smaller samples based on the
rubric of cultural clusters.
To do so, we ¯rst ran our regressions using weights based on the inverse of
the number of societies in each cultural cluster (Table 6). We also drew two inde-
pendent samples by randomly selecting one society from each of the 412 clusters
in the original Murdock system (Tables 7 and 8). The means and standard de-
viations of the included variables are not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from
those shown for the full sample in Table 5. All three samples produce less well-
¯tting regressions as measured by the pseudo R-squares. The coe±cients from the
weighted regressions are generally less likely to be statistically signi¯cant but do
not exhibit sign reversals relative to those shown in Table 5. As compared to the
coe±cients shown for the full sample in Table 5, the coe±cients for the smaller
two samples are less likely to be statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero as
the standard error of the estimates increases. Thus inference based on the more
restrictive samples, as with the weighted sample, tends to reduce the support for
¯nding an e®ect of our included variables. However, there are no statistically sig-
ni¯cant sign reversals in these regressions, so the causal direction, if there at all, is
in the direction shown in Table 5. In all three tables, large patrilineal kin groups
have a larger positive e®ect on ¯xed rule probabilities and plow technology has a
more pronounced negative e®ect than in Table 5.
We also ran our regressions on the SCCS sample of societies. This produces
a particularly small sample size, as only 161 societies have su±cient data to be
30included in the regressions. These results are similar in their lack of statistical
signi¯cance and lack of di®erence from Table 5 in terms of sign changes, so we
desist from presenting them.
Thus these ¯ndings are mixed. We ¯nd weak support for base-level environ-
mental e®ects on rule adoption. Agricultural sophistication has a weakly negative
relationship with rule adoption. Skilled labor markets appear to matter in re-
ducing reliance on a ¯xed rule, while unskilled labor markets appear to have no
signi¯cant impact on rule adoption, which is relatively our strongest result. We
¯nd evidence that other structures within societies support the presence of ¯xed
rules (or at least coexist with ¯xed rules). We would characterize these ¯ndings
as exploratory but encouraging, and as more indicative of the potential for further
development and investigation of this line of theorizing, both at a systematic and
at a case study level, than strongly supportive of our simple theory as it currently
stands.
Aside from issues relating to sample construction, there are obviously issues re-
lating to the underlying construction of the variables: the highly aggregate nature
of the available information, the endogenous nature of some of the included vari-
ables, and questions about the correctness of the coding of the variables by Mur-
dock. It would be interesting but challenging to go back to the original sources (as
contained in the Human Relations Area Files) and attempt to recode these data
and see if any additional data were available regarding variations within societies
in the use of location rules and other included variables (thus perhaps generating
additional observations at a subsocietal level).
If more work were to be done at this aggregated level, additional control and
explanatory variables would need to be incorporated. For instance, Ember and
Ember (1971) consider the role of warfare in determining marital residence rules
for a set of 33 societies. This variable would need to be carefully coded for a
much larger sample of societies than those contained in the Ethnographic Atlas.
Additional empirical work in this area might be more pro¯tably directed at char-
acterizing variations within societies, including observing di®erences in rules and
transfer amounts between villages and/or classes, as well as changes over time,
and considering them in light of di®erences in environmental variability and labor
markets measured at the same level.
Another extension along both theoretical and empirical grounds would be to
consider the gender division of labor in these societies simultaneously with the mar-
ital location decision and the types of labor performed. In Baker and Jacobsen
(2005), we take a step towards theorizing why the gender division of labor is pre-
scribed in most societies. Development of a broader theory of why multiple social
31rules exist along gender lines, how these rules interact, and what environmental
features cause variation in these rules is a large task that will require commitment
of more researchers to this research agenda.
4 Conclusions
We have argued that ¯xed marriage customs, often observed in a spectrum of pre-
modern societies, may be a response to contracting di±culties created by the fact
that human capital investments in future wives and husbands are noncontractable
and must be made well before the date of actual marriage. We show in a simple
model that ¯xed marriage customs can overcome this di±culty by ¯xing the terms
of the marriage contract and ruling out the possibility of renegotiation at the
contract (marriage) date. In our model there is a cost associated with rigidity,
however: it is impossible for parties to engage in pareto-improving renegotiation
at the wedding date. We ¯nd some evidence in support of some of the predictions
stemming from our model, but are unable to con¯rm strongly our human capital-
based view of how ¯xed residence rules are determined.
Our theory suggests that the increasingly-observed pattern of neolocality, which
is so prevalent in societies such as the United States as to be considered a rule
in itself, is a natural outcome given the increased use of formal labor markets,
including ones for more specialized labor that operate over wide geographic areas,
and the reduced importance of knowledge of local environmental conditions in
order to earn one's living. In a Darwinian view, societies that either relinquish
their ¯xed rule or had a °exible rule to begin with might well have the advantage
over societies that continue to maintain ¯xed rules beyond their useful lifespan.
Our view that some cultural institutions exist so as to restrict the bounds
of contracting behavior may have a substantial amount of applications not only
regarding marriage markets but regarding many other behaviors as well. This
suggests that these institutions have an important economic role in encouraging
investment in particular types and amounts of capital. It also suggests a potential
dynamic approach to considering the demise of such institutions: as markets arise,
they replace custom in determining the types of contracts that can be made and
the terms on which they are made.
32Notes
1. An excellent source for detailed descriptions of marriage institutions and trans-
fers in a variety of cultures is Goody (1990)
2. Though recently there has been some cross-cultural work done in economics.
See, for example, Agarwal (1994), Baker (2003), Baker and Miceli (2005),
Anderson and Swimmer (1997), and Stodder (1992) for some approaches to
cross-cultural analysis.
3. Recent papers discussing this result in full detail include Che and Hausch
(1999), Che and Chung (1999), Maskin and Tirole (1999), and Hart and Moore
(1999).
4. Indeed, one novelty of our approach is that the magnitude and direction of
transfer payments associated with marriage are endogenized.
5. Williamson (1983, 1985) is the seminal work on the hold-up problem. A num-
ber of researchers have focused on the cooperative investment/hold-up prob-
lem: In addition to the recent papers mentioned in footnote 1, see also Aghion,
Dewatripont, and Rey (1994), Chung (1992), Noldecke and Schmidt (1995),
Hart and Moore (1988), and Moore and Repullo (1988) for discussion of aspects
of this problem.
6. See Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Williamson
(1983). See also Aghion and Bolton (1992), Aghion and Tirole (1997), and
Rogerson (1992).
7. See Che and Chung (1999).
8. In Baker and Jacobsen (2005), we study a model in which marriage partners
bargain in an environment with opportunity for additional search if bargaining
breaks down. The results are qualitatively similar, but more complex, to those
presented in this paper. See also Konrad and Lummerud (2000). The critical
thing is that parties have some bargaining power. The results probably would
not carry through in a model in which the marriage market was frictionless,
and indeed, the nature of human capital investments is not obvious in this
case. On this question, see Peters and Siow (2002).
9. While we therefore suppose that customs serve to enhance e±ciency, we do
not mean to preclude the importance of other factors in determining custom.
For a discussion of these points, see Greif (1994, 1998).
10. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this possibility to our attention.
3311. OW
w and OH
h denote the partial derivatives of OW and OH with respect to w
and h.
































hold. This condition means that the degree of complementary between the two
investments cannot be so large so as to overwhelm the concavity of the value
function.
13. Note that while our model is couched such that transfers occur at the time of
marriage, it is not literally necessary that the entire amount be transferred at
that point, only that the total value be agreed upon at that point and not be
subject to subsequent renegotiation. While it might be simpler for enforcement
purposes to transfer amounts at that point, it does not preclude installment
payments. In addition, this does not preclude other transfers between house-
holds that take place subsequently for other reasons such as additional risk-
pooling and income sharing; see Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) for a discussion
of how such transfers may occur between households subsequent to their link
through marriage.
14. We are unable to address the question of what happens when marriage occurs
across two societies with di®erent post-marital location rules. Essentially we
only consider cases where people marry within a particular societal structure.
The available data do not allow us to consider these situations empirically.
15. Many cross-cultural analyses rely on a strati¯ed subset of these data known
as the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS), which contains 186 societies,
all but three of which are in the original Murdock sample, and has additional
variables coded for all or part of this sample. We did some additional analysis
using the SCCS, but found it unsatisfactory because the additional variables
either did not capture the concepts we are interested in, or were coded for only
a subset of the SCCS. Thus the loss of sample size is not o®set by increased
data availability for the societies included.
3416. As the data contains no information on household or village-speci¯c data on
environmental variability, we are unable to explore how much environmental
variability measured at this level a®ects the likelihood of adopting a ¯xed
rule, both through a®ecting the relative importance of location-speci¯c human
capital. This issue has been explored in regards to intergenerational transfers
by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) and Grimard and Hamilton (1999).
17. As an alternative measure of the temperate/verdant nature of di®erent envi-
ronments, we also collected average yearly rainfall data for each of our soci-
eties, using the same longitude and latitude point. This variable proved to be
statistically insigni¯cant when used either alone or in tandem with our other
environmental variables, and we have not reported these results herein. A
referee also suggested that we extend our empirical analysis to consider infor-
mation on variation in the temperature range and water availability from year
to year. We followed up on this suggestion by using data from the Global His-
torical Climatology Network (1992), again matching each society to its nearest
weather station, and computing both standard deviations across yearly aver-
ages and coe±cients of variation for all available years for each station. Neither
the standard deviations nor the coe±cients of variation proved to be statis-
tically signi¯cant when entered in the regressions in place of or in addition
to within-year temperature range, and the new measure of rainfall variation
also was not statistically signi¯cant. We also ran speci¯cations using climate
type dummy variables, relying on the Koppen ¯ve-level classi¯cation (tropical,
dry, temperate, cold, polar) and rejected joint signi¯cance for the set; there
was a small negative e®ect of polar (only 11 societies in our full sample). The
Koppen classi¯cation data was constructed with the aid of Peter Guth using
data from the dataset Global Climate Normals (1990).
18. We also recoded our agricultural technology level index into six rather than
two levels, and also tried entering these levels as dummies rather than as an
index. These regression speci¯cations do not outperform our reported ones.
19. Pryor (1977) also ¯nds that societies that rely upon animal husbandry tend
to have unskilled labor markets. Indeed, both of our models are similar to the
variety of models that Pryor ¯ts outlining a variety of factors leading to the
emergence of markets.
3520. We also tried alternative speci¯cations wherein the various variables relating to
reliance on agriculture/herding and/or the agricultural technology level were
interacted with the temperature range. This interaction term was not statis-
tically signi¯cant and the speci¯cation did not ¯t better than the ones shown
using noninteracted terms. Per a referee's suggestion, we also constructed
an index that interacted reliance on agriculture/herding with the agricultural
technology level and ran speci¯cations that included this variable both in lieu
of and in addition to the two underlying variables. This variable was never sta-
tistically signi¯cant and these speci¯cations did not outperform our reported
ones.
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Patrilocal Pro¯les 73.7%
Patrilocal Normal residence with or near the male
patrilineal kinsmen of the husband
45.5%
Virilocal Equivalent to patrilocal, but con¯ned
to instances where the husband's pa-
trikin are not aggregated in patrilocal
and patrilineal kin groups
23.1%
Avunculocal Normal residence with or near the ma-
ternal uncle or other male matrilineal






Matrilocal Normal residence with or near the fe-
male matrilineal kinsmen of the wife
5.0%
Uxorilocal Equivalent to matrilocal, but con¯ned
to instances where the wife's matrikin




Ambilocal Residence established optionally with
or near the parents of either the hus-
band or the wife, depending upon cir-
cumstances or personal choice, where
neither alternative exceeds the other in







Neolocal Normal residence apart from the rela-
tives of both spouses or at a place not
determined by the kin ties of either
4.7%
Duolocal/Natolocal No common household established;
both spouses remain in their natal
households
0.9%
Table 1: Marital residence pro¯les and frequencies. Pro¯les follow descriptions in
Murdock (1967: 48). Number of societies with a description of marital residence
= 859 (out of a total of 862 societies)Dependent Variable: Presence of a skilled labor market




Dual strati¯cation present 2.08¤¤
(1.01)
Total crafts production index 1.03¤¤
(0.37)
Intensive agriculture present 1.80¤¤
(0.97)
Extensive agriculture present 0.012¤¤
(0.006)
Wald test statistic 13.29¤¤
Table 2: Logit model to predict presence of skilled labor markets (N=57). Depen-
dent variable = presence of a skilled labor market. (¤¤¤=99% sig., ¤¤=95% sig.,
¤=90% sig.)Dependent Variable: Presence of an unskilled labor market




Dual strati¯cation present -4.54¤¤
(2.50)
Animal use in cultivation present -3.79¤¤
(1.99)




Percentage of subsistence from agriculture -1.47¤¤
(0.74)
Percentage of subsistence from animal husbandry 2.43¤¤¤
(0.90)
Wald test statistic 8.46
Table 3: Logistic model to predict presence of skilled labor markets (N=57). De-
pendent variable = presence of a skilled labor market (¤¤¤=99% sig., ¤¤=95% sig.,























































































Number of societies 848 744 104
Table 4: Variable means and standard deviations, overall and by ¯xed and °exible
residence rule. (¤¤denotes signi¯cantly di®erent from the °exible residence mean
at 95% on a two-tailed t-test)V
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